Wednesday, 19 February 2014

THE CONCEPT AND NATURE OF THE LAW


         THE CONCEPT AND NATURE OF THE LAW


              The issue of what is the law has a defied a universal definition despite numeruos attempts by jurists. The term has also left the realm of the abstract to being used for human beings.Thus you tend to hear: I am the law. this phrase any of us have heard many times both in art works and in the real life. It does not matter if it's a dialogue set in the Soviet Union of Siberia, or ramshackle village in the desert of the American West or even in sub sahara Africa . The phrase sticks well both in the mouth of a medieval king as the head of the Turkish prison in Midnight Express. The phrase is always a climax, because it is usually issued by the Branch and not the root. When the holder of a Power makes that statement, then the conversation has reached the climax, to the top, to its highest point, because from that point the conversation has reached its moment of greater dramatic tension but also its climax.

               The claim I am the law is a contradiction. This is because the law was created precisely so that is not the will of a person who erected the last resort of order. The law therefore always has an external character who holds the power. The law comes as the commitment of Power than a subjective thing as the will of every moment that it becomes sort order of things. Therefore the law is something external, independent of that generated thereof  or that must enforce. The law requires, by its very nature and essence is an act of obligation, an act of self-commitment of Power. So the statement: I am the law, is to disregard the external character of law concept. Likewise it ignores the assumed binding character. The law requires everyone in every circumstance. Forces all as provided by law, in all circumstances listed in the law. The law subjects all, the law does not submit to anyone. So the above said boastful phrase which presupposes one supersedes the law smacks of  ignorance of the fact that the law is unsuplantable. Attempting to replace the law written by the individual will is go in reverse the path it has followed civilization and the development of understanding of how things should be.

             It would seem today that nobody in their right mind would not replace the lex by voluntas. Big mistake. Nobody wants to make this substitution absolutely, but there is that temptation to do same every time the power interests. By law, we make a second law without depriving of the power of the first, allow override of an obligation arising under the first law . The way to go is either to cancel the law, or create a second law that allows me to nullify the obligation of the former law when deemed appropriate.

              Externally maintain the look and appearance of lex, but under that outward appearance hides again voluntas. The fact that the law was written down by our ancestors was not a trivial act. The law passed and written through the hands of the legislature is a manifestation of the external, the same as the emanated and knows what he promised. And through commitment comes an obligation. The problem comes when the law emanated (and therefore committed) and write a second law that says I have committed, but that commitment is to be understood according to the second law that when I want to commit or not commit.

            This may seem an affront to reason, and it is. But what else is such a pardon? Arguably, there are special cases where it would be an attack on the reason and logic to apply the law in all its wholesomeness. But do not realize who defend that position that if a discretion to law practice holds, then one cannot complain that there is the force of law to escape. A pardon is an offence against the law. It is a violation of law covered. But make no mistake, it is a cover in voluntas robbing. Each pardon is nothing but an attack on the law. But the problem is not the number of pardons, the problem lies in the mere fact that the possibility of attack on the concept of law is accepted. Because we  accepted that possibility, it will be used right in the most unfortunate moment, in the most delicate and most times contrary to the intention of those who passed the possibility of pardon. But they cannot complain, because from the moment that we replace the written and objective formulation, the intention and decision, since that time we have left the clear and objective paths of written law and subjugated same to the political, financial convenience and social pressure.

            we have focused on the cases of pardon as these are a figure of frequent social scandal. Gerald Ford got the charge having agreed in advance that it would grant a presidential pardon of Nixon, Clinton just in the last week of term is alienated signing pardons. But although the pardon has more media attention, unfortunately the law has many back doors. This dialectic between lex and voluntas is unsurpassed. In a more civilized and rational society that is always latent than dialectic. And it will be dorminant for a powerful reason: the very idea of ​​foundation of the law you have. If the basis and foundation of the law is only the convenience, then heroism will become compelling expedient on the part of the rulers. It is true that the law seeks the convenience of all, but one thing is:  that's an end and another which is their ultimate foundation. For when the convenience of all collides with mine, I may have no basis of the law to shake off convienience. In principle, this reasoning may seem selfish, but it is logical. If carried to its logical argument, convenience as the foundation of law, the clear implication is that there are times when the law would be meaningless to anyone in particular.

           However, if the foundation of the law is the consideration that there is an objective and immutable order, then yes you can ask me a personal convenience beyond my sacrifices in a  logical way. In other words, the desirability of this as the foundation of law involves not require an absolute power to voluntas that folds to the lex mode. Normally, this does not usually cause problems because the voluntas of offenders usually  have no power. But when they have the Power of  voluntas, then we should not be surprised that leads to its logical argument of convenience.

            In essence, if everything in the end is really that convenience say what the law says, the entire legal system becomes a mere regulation to the one that must fulfill and comply. Convenience means the internal cancer of the intangibility of the lex. Only he who believes in it inviolability may believe in the lex.

            These sidewalk considerations of the concept of law may seem overly abstract and theoretical, but on the contrary, are embodied in countless social and personal concretions. According to the concept of law that one will have different mode of regulation; the way to make this law, and how to fulfill oneself. This tour we have done through the dialectic between voluntas and lex leads us to recognize that there are many legal theorists who consider the lex voluntas more like that as lex.Stated more clearly, in a cosmos in which all order was apparent, the result of a mere cultural convention, the law would only be a mirage, a precarious and artificial order, a wobbly island in the middle of a cosmos governed by law merely apparent order. Only the man who believes there is an absolute basis for the law can make a sacrifice for all the law and can ask their citizens to sacrifice in absolute terms by the law.

            The law must be inflexible. The law by its very nature is blind and unyielding. It is a force that is created once and left to its own device and authority. The problem stems from the extent to which the State believes in the same inflexible order of things. The law cannot ask for heroics if an entire society does not believe in the value of heroism. And heroism is only reasonable if there is an absolute value which carry it out. Hence the reasoning no doubt admits no absolute foundation for the inflexibility of law .there is no ability to ask for the  inflexibility of the law.

            As an example of this natural breakdown of law and how to apply it, we can argue for example, the recent case judgment of a judge  to a person who beat up another and he was sentenced to cleaning windows. The judge explained that he had imposed this penalty because observing this punishment the convict had to look again and again. I could give a long list of statements that seem unrealistic given the crimes, the terrible damage inflicted on innocent people. It could also give a long list of occasions when a Becket and Thomas More and many others blew their lives for the defence of the law, to defend the sanctity of the law against the will of law in disguise. But one need not argue lists of heroic moments and petty now. Right degradation is inevitable fruit of the conception of the order of things you have.
Conclusions
            We are slaves of the law not to be slaves to the will and whims of another man. The state that has respect for its laws is a state that has respect for itself. Conversely, the state that has no respect for its laws is a state that lack respect itself. The law; the rule of law is the order of reason. And all these sounds wonderful.But  the concept of law ultimately depends on other concepts. And ultimately, the logical argument of the first satellite of St. Thomas Aquinas on the ultimate foundation fiercely applies not only to the material world, but the world of concepts. Some depend on other concepts, concepts can also break, can also fall into the void if we go back a few logical steps behind. Eventually the concept of law is much more objective than some might imagine. All defend the law, but not all are fully aware of the extent to which the law is truly authentic and calculative






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